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Abstract—Satellite imagery is becoming increasingly accessible
due to the growing number of orbiting commercial satellites.
Many applications make use of such images: agricultural man-
agement, meteorological prediction, damage assessment from
natural disasters, or cartography are some of the examples.
Unfortunately, these images can be easily tampered and modified
with image manipulation tools damaging downstream appli-
cations. Because the nature of the manipulation applied to
the image is typically unknown, unsupervised methods that
don’t require prior knowledge of the tampering techniques used
are preferred. In this paper, we use ensembles of generative
autoregressive models to model the distribution of the pixels of
the image in order to detect potential manipulations. We evaluate
the performance of the presented approach obtaining accurate
localization results compared to previously presented approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Satellite imagery is used in a wide range of applications
such as regional infrastructure levels assessment [1], [2], agri-
cultural crops classification [3], [4], forest characterization [5],
scene classification [6], [7], soil moisture estimation [8], [9]
and meteorological analysis, including precipitation prediction
[10], thunderstorm detection [11] and wind speed and direction
estimation [12]. These applications are possible thanks to the
exponentially growing number of commercial satellites [13]
(with many of those having imaging capabilities). Many image
datasets captured by satellites are available to the public [14],
[15], [16], such as Planet Labs or the European Space Agency
image datasets [17], [18].
Editing tools like GIMP [19] or Photoshop [20] can be used
to forge and manipulate satellite images in a realistic manner.
Furthermore, manipulation generation can be automated by
using machine learning techniques [21], removing the need
for manual editing. Such manipulation methods, combined
with the ease of sharing data on the internet, can difficult the
institutions and companies that make use of images captured
by satellites. Indeed, several instances of manipulated images
have surged in recent years, including the nighttime flyovers
of India during the Diwali festivals [22], the Malaysia Airlines
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Flight incident [23], and the images of the spliced fake Chinese
bridge [24].
There is a wide range of manipulations techniques that can
be used to forge satellite images. Some examples include
splicing [25] (cropping and pasting regions from different
image sources), copy-move [26] (cropping and pasting regions
within the same image), shadow removal [27], and machine
learning-based forgeries, often generated using Generative Ad-
versarial Networks (GANs) [21]. Multiple methods to detect
image manipulations have been proposed in recent years [28],
[29], [30]. However, these methods are typically designed
for images captured with consumer cameras and fail with
images from other imaging devices, such as satellite imagery,
with different compression schemes, post-processing, sensors,
and color channels. Therefore, the detection of manipulations
within satellite imagery still remains an unsolved problem that
requires the development of new detection techniques that are
accurate regardless of the nature of the manipulations and
image capturing technology.
In this work, we show how PixelCNN [31] and Gated
PixelCNN [32], two generative autoregressive models, can
be used to detect pixel-level manipulations. These neural
networks, commonly used to generate new images, can model
the distribution of a pixel given a set of previously seen
pixels (neighboring pixels). These neural networks can assign
a conditional likelihood value to a given pixel, and in turn,
a likelihood value to a complete image. Through sampling
from the pixel distribution, new images can be generated in
a sequential fashion. Furthermore, manipulated pixels can be
detected by selecting the pixels with a low likelihood assigned
by the neural network. By averaging the likelihood estimated
by an ensemble of multiple networks, the method is able
to obtain a more accurate manipulation localization. Figure
1 presents the proposed ensemble where multiple networks
process the input image and its flipped and rotated versions.
Then, all predictions are averaged in order to obtain a robust
prediction. Finally, we evaluate the localization precision of
the presented method using a dataset composed of images with
splicing forgeries, first introduced in [33].
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we present
previous work on manipulation detection and autoregressive
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Fig. 1. Proposed ensemble: multiple models process the flipped and rotated input images. The prediction of every network is averaged obtaining a final robust
and accurate likelihood estimate for each pixel of the image. The 8 images of pθ(xi|x<i) are plotted as − log pθ(xi|x<i) for visualization purposes.
models. In section III we describe the dataset composed by
images captured by a satellite. In section IV we describe the
presented method. In section V we show the experimental
results and we conclude the paper with section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Many techniques to detect a wide range of image manipula-
tions have been previously presented. Some examples include
techniques that detect manipulations by using embedded meta-
data [34], finding double-JPEG compression artifacts [35],
using neural networks with domain adaptation [36], using
deepfakes detection neural networks [37] or using saturation
cues [38]. Several methods have proved to accurately detect
spliced objects within images captured with consumer-level
cameras [25], [39]. The method presented in [25] extracts a
fingerprint from the camera model used to capture the image
in order to suppress the scene content and enhance camera
model-related artifacts. The method presented in [39] makes
use of a feature-based technique that can detect splicing in
images without any prior information of the nature of the
manipulations by detecting traces left locally by processing
steps within the capturing device. Unfortunately, many of these
methods perform poorly when applied to satellite imagery. The
image acquisition process differs between consumer cameras
(including smartphone cameras) and satellites: different sensor
technologies and post-processing steps such as orthorectifi-
cation, radiometric corrections, and compression are used.
Because of these differences, methods designed for consumer
cameras do not transfer properly to satellite imagery.
Recently, multiple methods designed to detect forgeries
in satellite imagery have been introduced. These include
methods using hand-crafted features, like watermarking-based
techniques [40], and data-driven machine learning-based ap-
proaches including supervised [41] and unsupervised [42],
[43], [33] methods. While supervised methods tend to perform
better, they might not generalize well to types of manipu-
lations that were not present in the training set. Therefore,
unsupervised methods, which don’t make use of manipulated
data during training, are preferred. The supervised method
presented in [41] makes use of a conditional GAN to detect
and localize splicing forgeries in satellite images by estimating
a forgery mask. The work introduced in [42] is based on a
GAN that encodes patches from the input image into a low
dimensional vector that is later used by a one-class support
vector machine (SVM) to detect if a patch contains forgeries
or not. The method presented in [43], named Sat-SVDD,
is a kernel-based one-class classification method that detects
splicing forgeries by using a modified Support Vector Data De-
scription (SVDD) [44]. The SVDD encodes each patch from
the original images (without manipulations) to a latent space
within a hypersphere. During testing, the latent vectors that
are placed outside the hypersphere are considered as patches
containing a forgery. The method in [33] makes use of a deep
belief network (DBN) [45] composed of two stacked layers
of restricted Boltzmann machines (RBM) [46] parametrized
with uniform distributions. The deep belief network is used
to reconstruct patches extracted from the image. Then, the
reconstruction error is used to detect if manipulations are
present: patches with a reconstruction error higher than a
threshold are considered as forgeries.
In this work, we use generative autoregressive models,
specifically PixelCNN [31] and Gated PixelCNN [32], which
are described in the following sections. Many autoregressive
generative models have been presented in recent years [47],
[32], [31]. Autoregressive models are able to estimate the dis-
tribution of an image by estimating the conditional distribution
of each pixel. The distribution of each pixel is estimated given
its neighboring pixels. Then, the distribution of an image can
be expressed as the product of the conditional distributions.
These models make use of masked convolutions in order to
respect autoregressive constraints: each pixel is reconstructed
only from previous pixels in a given ordering. PixelCNN and
its recurrent-based counterpart PixelRNN [31], showed that
autoregressive modeling can be successfully used to generate
new images. Many variations have been presented such as
Gated PixelCNN [32], PixelCNN++ [48], PixelSNAIL [49].
Furthermore, the same approach has been extended to video
modeling in Video Pixel Network (VPN) [50], variational
autoencoders in PixelVAE [51] and PixelVAE++ [52], and to
generative adversarial networks in PixelGAN [53].
Some works have studied the capability of likelihood mod-
els to detect outliers. The work presented in [54] makes
use of the Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC) to
detect outliers. The work in [55] normalizes the likelihood
estimate of an image with a measure of complexity to detect
outliers. However, most of these approaches focus on image-
level out of distribution (OoD) estimates (also referred to as
anomaly detection), and likelihood methods to detect pixel-
level manipulations remain unexplored.
III. DATASET
In order to train and evaluate our method, we use the
dataset first introduced in [33]. This dataset is composed of
orthorectified satellite images including regions of Slovenia
taken from the Sentinel program [56]. The images have a
resolution of 1000×1000 pixel. We use a subset of the dataset
consisting of 98 original images (without manipulations) for
training and 500 manipulated images with their corresponding
ground truth masks for testing. Each manipulated image has
one spliced object randomly selected among 19 different
objects, including clouds, planes, smoke, and drones. The
objects are spliced with different locations, rotation angles
and sizes including 16 × 16, 32 × 32, 64 × 64, 128 × 128,
and 256×256 pixels. Figure 2 presents some examples of the
dataset.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
A. Autoregressive Models
PixelCNN [31] and Gated PixelCNN [32] are neural net-
works composed by multiple fully-convolutional residual lay-
ers and are trained to model the distribution of an image x as
the product of the conditional distributions of every pixel xi:
p(x) =
L∏
i=1
p(xi|x1, ..., xi−1) (1)
Where x is an image of L pixels and xi is the ith pixel
of the image. The predicted distribution of every pixel xi is
conditional to the previous pixels x1, ..., xi−1 in a raster scan
order: row by row and pixel by pixel within every row (left
to right and top to bottom).
In RGB images, each color channel (R, G, B) is modeled
successively: first the red channel, then the green channel
conditioned to the red, and finally the blue channel conditioned
to the red and green. Therefore, the conditional probability of
an RGB pixel is as follows:
Fig. 2. Examples of images (left) from the dataset and its corresponding
manipulation masks (right).
p(xi|x<i) = p(xi|x1, ..., xi−1) =
p(xi,R|x<i)p(xi,G|x<i, xi,R)p(xi,B |x<i, xi,R, xi,G)
(2)
The autoregressive constraints are achieved by masking
the convolutions accordingly, both within spatial dimensions
and within features maps. The use of convolutions allows
the network to perform the likelihood predictions in parallel
during training and testing but the image generation remains
a sequential process.
While our method is designed for RGB images, it is
common for satellites to capture multi-spectral images con-
taining more than 3 channels. The presented approach can
be easily extended to any number of channels by assigning
some arbitrary order within the channels and estimating the
conditional probability as follows:
p(xi|x<i) =
C∏
j=1
p(xi,j |x<i, xi,1, ..., xi,j−1) (3)
Where xi,j is the ith pixel from the jth channel of an image
with a total of C channels.
PixelCNN and Gated PixelCNN models the conditional
probability p(xi|x<i) as a multinomial (categorical) distribu-
tion through a softmax layer where each channel within the
image can take a value from 0 to 255. The network takes as
input an image with N×M×3 dimensions (with N×M = L)
and outputs a prediction with dimension N ×M × 3 × 256.
While the original PixelCNN is designed to work with 8-bit
images, the method can be adapted to work with images with
different bit depths by properly changing the range of values
that the softmax layer can take. For example, when working
with 11-bit images, the softmax layer should output values
from 0 to 2047. This is especially useful for satellite imagery
as many datasets have bit depths higher than 8-bits.
B. Generative Ensembles
We can obtain more accurate and robust predictions by com-
bining multiple networks within an ensemble. We average the
predictions of multiple networks with different parameters and
scan orderings. In order to obtain multiple model parameters,
we save the parameters of the network at different epochs
during the training process. The parameters θ of the network
at each training epoch can be seen as an approximate proxy
of posterior samples of p(θ|D) (the distribution of the model
parameters given the training set D). To use different scan
orderings during the autoregressive modeling (the order in
which neighboring pixels are observed) we can apply different
masks to the convolutional filters, or equivalently, rotate and
horizontally flip the input image. Figure 3 shows the 8 different
orderings used and the transformations (flip and rotate) applied
to the input image and the corresponding convolutional mask
to obtain equivalent results.
The average of the prediction of multiple networks with
different parameters and scan order can be understood as a
Monte Carlo approximation of the marginal likelihood of each
pixel p(xi), where the effect of the model parameters θ and
scan ordering x<i are smoothed out:
p(xi) = Eθ,x<i [pθ(xi|x<i)] ≈
1
K
∑
ω∈Ω
pθ(xi|x<i) (4)
Where ω are samples of model parameters and scan ordering
pairs (θ,x<i) from a set Ω of size |Ω| = K. In other words,
the average of the prediction of K networks with different
parameters and scan orderings are used to approximate the
marginal likelihood pˆ(xi) ≈ p(xi). In order to detect manipu-
lations, we can use the negative log-likelihood, which in turn
is the information content (or Shannon information) quantity
I(xi) = − log p(xi), approximated as:
Iˆ(xi) = − log[ 1
K
∑
ω∈Ω
pθ(xi|x<i)] (5)
A pixel is considered to be manipulated if Iˆ(xi) > T , where
T is experimentally selected. Ideally, the model will assign
high likelihood values (and thus small information values) to
pixels that have not been manipulated, and small likelihood
(and high information) values to manipulated pixels.
C. Training and Testing Setup
In this work, we use a PixelCNN composed of 7 residual
blocks and a Gated PixelCNN composed of 6 gated blocks. We
train the networks with the Adam optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.001. During the training process, we randomly rotate
0, 90, 180, or 270 degrees and horizontally flip the images.
We train the network for 1000 epochs and we store the model
parameters every 20 epochs.
During testing, the ensemble is composed of K = 50
different models. We select 50 model parameters uniformly
Fig. 3. Different convolutional masks and the respective transformation
(flipping and rotation) performed to the input image to obtain the equivalent
effect.
distributed from epoch 30 to epoch 1000 of the training
process. For each model parameters we use a scan ordering
randomly selected from the 8 different scan orderings shown
in figure 3.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We train and evaluate our method with the dataset presented
in Section III. The ensemble of networks is trained only
with original images and no manipulated images are used
during the training process. In order to evaluate the localization
performance of the presented method, we compute the area
under the curve (AUC) of the Precision/Recall (P/R) curves
by changing the threshold T applied to the estimated negative
loglikelihood Iˆ(xi). Table I presents our results compared
with previous methods. Different Precision/Recall are shown
for each of the different sizes of the objects spliced into the
images. For example, P/R32 is the AUC of the P/R curve for
manipulated images with spliced objects of size 32× 32.
Our experimental results show that the generative ensemble
of PixelCNNs and Gated PixelCNNs outperform previously
presented methods. Methods [25] and [39] have been pre-
viously used to successfully detect splicing manipulations
in consumer-level cameras but our experiments suggest that
they fail when faced with satellite imagery. While most of
the methods fail to detect objects smaller than 64 × 64, the
presented generative ensembles are able to properly detect
small forgeries. Methods such as [42], [43], and [33] produce
estimates within patches of the input image, therefore lacking
enough resolution to detect small forgeries. On the contrary,
PixelCNN and Gated PixelCNN process the whole image
in a fully-convolutional manner and detects manipulations
in a pixel-level providing higher detection accuracy. We can
observe that Gated PixelCNN provides more accurate results
than the regular PixelCNN network, especially for objects
smaller than 64 × 64 pixels. These results are aligned with
previous works [32] which have shown that Gated PixelCNN
is able to model the image distribution of the training images
TABLE I
AUC SCORES (%) OF THE P/R CURVES FOR THE LOCALIZATION TASK. THE SUBSCRIPT (P/R×) DENOTES THE MANIPULATION SIZE.
Method P/R16 P/R32 P/R64 P/R128 P/R256 Average
Noiseprint [25] 0.0 0.1 2.5 4.6 7.8 3.0
Yarlagadda et al [42] 0.0 0.3 2.5 18.3 37.8 11.7
Splicebuster [39] 0.0 0.5 7.8 31.2 48.5 17.6
Sat-SVDD [43] 0.1 1.4 18.1 34.4 55.7 21.9
UU-DBN [33] 7.5 13.3 31.7 40.5 48.8 28.4
Generative Ensemble (PixelCNN) 37.6 44.6 56.2 65.3 75.6 55.9
Generative Ensemble (Gated PixelCNN) 46.3 53.8 61.1 65.6 72.8 59.9
more accurately (with a lower negative log-likelihood score)
than PixelCNN.
Note that the networks are trained in a fully unsupervised
manner without any semantic information (label or ground
truth) of the spliced objectes. Therefore, the networks learn the
regularities of the training images and detect as manipulations
out-of-distribution regions of the images, regardless of the
spliced object (e.g. clouds, planes...). While this approach is
well suited for overhead imagery where large (unsupervised)
datasets can be collected and images are visually similar (e.g.
mountain regions tend to look alike from overhead imagery),
further experiments need to be performed on consumer-level
camera multimedia images.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The wide range of manipulations that can be applied to
images and the large diversity of imaging technologies used
in satellites makes their detection a challenging problem that
still remains unsolved. In this paper, we introduced an un-
supervised splicing detection method. The method consists of
an ensemble of generative autoregressive models that estimates
the pixel distribution of the image. The method is capable to
accurately detect manipulated pixels by selecting the regions of
the image where the network predicts a low likelihood value.
The presented method is fully unsupervised and doesn’t use
any prior knowledge from the applied manipulation during
training. Our experiments show that the localization accuracy
of our method surpasses the previous works and shows that
generative models, specially autoregressive-based networks,
provide a promising approach to detect pixel-level manipu-
lations.
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